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Introduction
Two Congressional efforts to ensure accountability over civilian contractors operating abroad include changes to the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA) 2 and UCMJ.
prosecute violations of the UCMJ under a different court system. This paper argues that, despite the expansion of UCMJ jurisdiction over civilian contractors, the UCMJ will not be the chief vehicle to ensure criminal accountability regarding contractor misconduct. As a result, Congress must ensure MEJA is strengthened.
After a brief background on the increase of contractors on the battlefield, this paper will first look at how Congress changed the UCMJ, how the Department of Defense (DoD) plans to implement the change, and the constitutionality of the provision. Next, the paper will look at
MEJA, specifically what the law covers, questions about its effectiveness, how it has changed and whether further changes are necessary.
Battlefield Contractors and a Jurisdictional Gap
While civilian involvement on the battlefield is not new, since the 1990s contractor support to military operations has become a growth industry. P.W. Singer, a foreign policy scholar, attributes such growth to a combination of factors, including increased instability since the Cold War, shrinking military budgets, and the rise of privatization. 4 Singer emphasizes that the companies providing support come in different forms, breaking down contractor support into three main areas: military provider firms, military consultant firms, and military support firms. 5 Provider firms, typically the most controversial, give assistance in the tactical environment and may engage in actual fighting; consultant firms provide advisory and training assistance and support firms focus on logistics. 6 As these companies grow, they may absorb other companies with different specialties, resulting in a blurring of the lines.
The rise of contractor support is depicted well in an August 2008 Congressional Budget
Office study on contractor personnel supporting operations in Iraq. The study indicated there were at least 190,000 contractors working in Iraq for a variety of U.S. agencies, including the Department of Defense (DoD), Department of State (DoS), and USAID. 7 The report indicated that "the ratio of about one contractor employee for every member of the U.S. armed forces in the Iraq theater is at least 2.5 times higher than the ratio during any other major U.S. conflict…" 12 This paper will now turn to a review of how the U.S. has strengthened jurisdiction over contractors, beginning with changes to the UCMJ.
UCMJ Jurisdiction over Contractors Expanded

What Changed
In a provision receiving little fanfare, the National Defense Authorization Act for 2007 modified Article 2(a)(10) of the UCMJ, expanding military jurisdiction over civilian contractors. 13 The change provides for military jurisdiction "in time of declared war or a contingency operation" to "persons serving with or accompanying an armed force in the field."
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The addition of "a contingency operation" vastly changed the jurisdictional landscape. The previous language, which only referred to war, had been judicially construed to mean wars declared by Congress, essentially resulting in civilian immunity from military criminal prosecution for the past 38 years.
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A precise understanding of the language contained in this UCMJ section is necessary to understand the full scope of the change. First, what is a contingency operation? The U.S. Code defines a contingency operation as follows:
The term "contingency operation" means a military operation that - Accordingly, a contingency operation can be designated by the Secretary of Defense or occur by operation of law when certain mobilization conditions are met.
Next, who are persons "serving with or accompanying an armed force." The use of "persons" in the code indicates a broad reach, encompassing DoD employees, contractors and even third country nationals. Courts have construed "serving with or accompanying" the armed forces to include situations where the contractor"s presence and activities were "not merely incidental but directly connected with, or dependent upon, the activities of the armed force or its personnel."maintenance contractor working on an Air Force base in Japan and contractors serving on merchant ships providing logistical support to military forces. 18 One case suggested that "accompanying" goes beyond "serving with." The case indicated that even if a contract was over and the contractor was not "serving with" an armed force, a continued connection with the military may still satisfy the "accompanying" requirement for jurisdiction. 19 Typically, "accompanying" language is seen in the case of dependents while "serving with" involves contractors.
Finally, what is "in the field?" Judicial interpretations of "in the field" have favored a construction that looks at what the personnel are doing, not where they are located. 20 Judicial interpretations of lower courts have been fairly broad, even including training operations in the United States done in preparation for deployments to a theater of war.
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In essence, the analysis appears to be more of a functional one, focusing on the activities of the contractor and how it relates to operations against an adversary. Yet at least one commentator suggests that the Supreme Court may not take such a broad view of either the "in the field" or "serving with or accompanying" language today. 22 For example, in They responded in support of another Blackwater security detail that was providing protection to a USAID member and had encountered a vehicle-born improvised explosive device. 30 The indicted Blackwater employees allegedly opened fire on civilians in the area.
As indicated in the case of the interpreter, due to the applicable Presidential Proclamations, the operations in Iraq are part of a "contingency operation." Further, the "in the field" requirement is likely satisfied for the same reasons mentioned in the previous example. What is less clear is whether the "service with or accompanying" the armed force requirement is met.
The contract was with the DoS, not the DoD. Arguably then, the Blackwater employees lack a sufficient nexus with the armed forces. However, to be sure, DoS and DoD efforts in Iraq to stabilize the country are inextricably linked, bolstering the connection between the Blackwater employees and the military mission. Yet, the question remains whether such linkage is enough to allow UCMJ jurisdiction over these employees.
Hurricane Response. At least one commentator suggested that UCMJ jurisdiction might apply to a domestic emergency such as a Hurricane Katrina type response. 31 Consider the following hypothetical. Let us assume that the President, under a Presidential Proclamation, federalized the National Guard in Mississippi to assist in responding to a hurricane. As part of the disaster relief effort, the Department of Homeland Security contracts with a private company to assist with security in order to prevent looting. A contractor with the company allegedly goes beyond the defensive use of force and kills a suspected looter. Could the new UCMJ provision apply?
First, the threshold requirement for a "contingency operation" is met by the Presidential Proclamation, which federalized the National Guard. Is the contractor "serving with or accompanying" the armed forces? Federal code defines armed forces as the army, navy, air force, marine corps, and coast guard. 32 While one could argue that the contractor was serving with or accompanying National Guard members and not the "armed forces," the stronger argument probably is that the contractor"s work meets this criterion if the National Guard members are serving in a Title 10 federal status. Assuming National Guard equals armed forces in this context, the question would be whether the contractor"s job had a sufficient nexus with the military operation. One might argue that because the contract is with DHS and not DOD, that the requirement is not met. Yet, the military role is to stabilize and secure the devastated area.
The contractor"s role appears to directly relate to this military mission and therefore, arguably is sufficiently connected to the military mission to warrant jurisdiction.
Finally, is the contractor "in the field?" As previously discussed, court opinions have considered the relation of the activity to an adversary or hostilities. However, the opinions have not placed geographical limits on defining "in the field," indicating the location could be in the specifically he failed to ensure the requirements for positive identification of the target were met.
Instead of killing an insurgent, he killed a high level Afghan official.
As discussed in the other examples, operations in Afghanistan meet the "contingency operation" requirement. Arguably the contractor"s actions have enough of a link to military activities to render a status of "serving with or accompanying" the armed forces. Factors that support such an interpretation includes that the nature of the mission is indistinguishable from similar military missions and that the employee is operating remotely from a military base. As indicated earlier, an argument against may be that the contractor was not working directly for the DoD.
Whether the contractor is "in the field" is also subject to interpretation. Again, a more functional than geographic analysis would suggest the contractor is "in the field" despite operating out of a base in the United States. Here, the contractor is being used directly to engage what was thought to be a hostile in an area of conflict. If the relation of the action to operations against an adversary is the linchpin, the activity in the hypothetical supports a "in the field" status. Interestingly, it is important to point out that if the civilian that operated the predator and fired the missile was a CIA employee instead of a contractor, the analysis would not change.
While the focus of this paper is on civilian contractors, the UCMJ"s provision also applies to civilian employees of the federal government.
In reviewing the examples above, it becomes apparent that, absent specific definitions for "serving with or accompanying" and "in the field," the full reach of this UCMJ provision will remain somewhat unclear and be decided on a case by case basis through judicial interpretation.
In addition to judicial interpretation of key statutory language, the new provision"s application will be determined by DoD implementation plans regarding the change to Article 2(a)(10).
DoD Implementation Guidance
In March 2008, Secretary of Defense Gates issued implementation guidance which represents a conservative approach to exercising this new UCMJ provision. The guidance indicates the DoD will give great deference to the DoJ, will withhold court-martial authority at very high levels, and may narrowly construe those cases in which UCMJ jurisdiction could attach.
The guidance from Secretary Gates makes clear that DoJ notification and consideration is required prior to the initiation of any court-martial charges or Article 15 proceedings. 33 The purpose of the notification is to afford the DoJ "an opportunity to determine if it intends to pursue U.S. federal criminal prosecution and to advise DoD accordingly." 34 This requirement reflects a deferential approach by the DoD. In essence, only those cases that the DoJ determines it will not prosecute will be available for further DoD action. The DoJ may decide not to go forward due to insufficient evidence or because it determines federal jurisdiction under MEJA or other federal laws is inapplicable.
In the event the DoJ declines the case, the decision to go forward with a military disposition resides with the Secretary of Defense or, in some cases, a general court-martial convening authority. If the offense occurred in the United States, the accused was "not at all times during the alleged misconduct located outside the "United States,"" or if the case was initiated in the United States, the Secretary of Defense is the decision authority. 35 In other cases, geographic combatant commanders and other commanders assigned to such commands with general court-martial convening authority will decide case disposition. 36 This guidance ensures that potential cases involving civilians will be scrutinized at the highest levels prior to going forward.
The guidance from Secretary Gates also emphasizes that the exercise of UCMJ jurisdiction be limited to cases of "military necessity to support an effective fighting force and be called for by circumstances that meet the interests of justice…" 37 He goes on to spell out such cases as those:
When U.S. federal jurisdiction otherwise does not apply or federal prosecution is not pursued, and/or
When the person"s conduct is adverse to a significant military interest of the United States (e.g., alleged misconduct that may jeopardize good order and discipline or discredit the armed forces and thereby have a potential adverse effect on military operations).
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In addition to emphasizing the deference given to the DoJ, this guidance appears to restrict the exercise of UCMJ jurisdiction to cases with a clear affect on good order and discipline or the military"s standing in the public eye. Yet, the application of this standard may not be as straightforward as one might think.
A review of some of the previous scenarios is useful in order to better understand the effect of the DoD implementation guidance. Before looking at the scenarios however, a review of how the military justice system defines conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline and conduct that is of the nature to bring discredit on the armed forces is necessary. Article 134 of the UCMJ states that "to the prejudice of good order and discipline": refers only to acts directly prejudicial to good order and discipline and not to acts which are prejudicial only in a remote or indirect sense. Almost any irregular or improper act on the part of a member of the military service could be regarded as prejudicial in some indirect or remote sense; however, this article does not include these distant effects. 39 Further, "conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces" is defined as follows:
""Discredit" means to injure the reputation of. The clause of Article 134 makes punishable conduct which has a tendency to bring the service into disrepute or which tends to lower it in public esteem." 40 Using these definitions as a frame of reference, the DoD implementation memo appears to focus on misconduct that has a direct affect on military operations or lowers public opinion.
Recall the case of the interpreter, whose charges related to an incident with another interpreter. Ultimately, since this case was the first and only case tried to date, the DoD obviously determined the requirements for jurisdiction were met. While he pled to lesser charges, the original allegation included assault on a fellow interpreter. The Army depended on these interpreters to communicate to the Iraqi police in order to facilitate training. Obviously this mission is jeopardized when the interpreters are fighting among each other. Arguably then the conduct was prejudicial in such a way as to have a potential effect on military operations.
Alternatively, one could argue that such conduct between two civilians is fairly minor and not likely to jeopardize good order and discipline in the armed forces in any measurable way.
What about the case of the Blackwater employees allegedly firing on civilians in Iraq?
Civilian casualties undermine the mission in Iraq. The public, certainly that in Iraq, will not distinguish between U.S. contractors and the U.S. military when placing blame. The image of the military is definitely damaged in such cases. The UAV scenario, which also involved a civilian casualty, would damage the military"s image for the same reasons. Accordingly, the implementation guidance could support jurisdiction in these cases.
The hurricane response example may warrant a different result. Because it involves a domestic scenario, it will likely be viewed more as a civilian police, and not a military matter.
Indeed, the case involves unlawful force against a civilian like the others. The requirement for the Secretary of Defense himself to make the ultimate decision reflects the more sensitive nature of court-martialing a civilian for misconduct in the United States.
Undoubtedly the implementation guidance has a cautionary tone, suggesting that officials will require a solid military nexus before exercising jurisdiction. Yet, as a review of the scenarios indicate, ultimately the scope of the new provision"s use will depend on subjective interpretations on what misconduct has enough of an effect on public opinion or good order and discipline in a given context. The constitutional history of civilian court-martials is one factor that counsels in favor of the apparent conservative DoD approach. The next section of the paper will review constitutional issues related to UCMJ jurisdiction over civilians.
Is UCMJ Jurisdiction over Civilians Constitutional?
The constitutional analysis begins with considering the basis for Congressional authority to provide for UCMJ jurisdiction over civilians. The U.S. Constitution gives Congress the power "To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval forces…" 41 Additionally, in referring to the enumerated powers of Congress such as the power to regulate the armed forces, the Constitution gives Congress the power to "make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers…" 42 The debate then is how far these constitutional provisions, when taken together, extend. A review of some court decisions addressing this issue gives insight into how courts may decide future cases in which the constitutionality of the new UCMJ provision is challenged. Court may recognize that such military exigencies exist outside a declared war, it will likely narrowly construe those circumstances in contingency operations that support military jurisdiction. The further removed the civilian is from "actual hostilities" the less likely the Court will find such jurisdiction appropriate. Additionally, the preference for using civilian trials when available and functioning will probably preclude UCMJ jurisdiction for offenses occurring in the U.S. such as those considered in the UAV and domestic emergency hypotheticals.
The statutory requirements of "serving with or accompanying the armed forces in the field," the DoD"s conservative approach to implementation, and constitutional concerns all serve to limit the reach of UCMJ jurisdiction over civilian contractors. Accordingly, it is necessary to consider MEJA, which represents other Congressional action aimed at ensuring accountability of civilian contractors serving alongside military members abroad.
The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act
In 2000 Congress considered the jurisdictional gap that precluded prosecution of civilians serving with or accompanying the armed forces abroad. MEJA"s legislative history indicates that Congress recognized that jurisdictional limits existed because of judicial holdings restricting UCMJ jurisdiction over civilians, the limited extraterritorial applicability of most laws and the inability or unwillingness of host-nation governments to pursue prosecutions. 60 Congress recognized that the Supreme Court cases of the 1950s and 1960s placed significant restrictions on UCMJ jurisdiction over contractors serving alongside the armed forces overseas. Congress also examined the applicability of domestic criminal law overseas and determined that few applied extraterritorially and that often the act must have occurred in "the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States," 61 or impact interstate or foreign commerce for jurisdiction to attach. 62 With the limited ability to enforce U.S. criminal law abroad, the U.S. left accountability with the foreign government that exercised control over the location of the crime.
The legislative history indicates Congress was unsatisfied with prosecution by host nation governments. Congress cited a DoD Inspector General (IG) report that indicated the lack of foreign interest in prosecuting crimes committed by Americans overseas. The 1999 DOD IG investigation reviewed 275 case files dealing with serious crimes, concluding that foreign governments took action in only 11% of the cases. 63 Congress indicated that the foreign government lacked motivation in cases in which the crime "was committed against another American or against property owned by an American or the United States Government." 64 Further, the committee report stated that the chance of foreign action was also limited by agreements that provided for exclusive U.S. jurisdiction such as the situation in the Balkans due to the Dayton accords and contexts where no functioning foreign government existed such as Somalia.
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As a result of the aforementioned concerns, MEJA was passed into law, allowing To date, many critics suggest that MEJA has yet to live up to its potential. As of April 2008, the DoJ reported it had brought charges against only 12 people since MEJA"s enactment, although other investigations were ongoing. 67 For many, this paucity in prosecutions demonstrates MEJA"s ineffectiveness. In testimony before Congress, one scholar suggested that MEJA"s ineffectiveness was due to "an attitude of official indifference within the Department of Justice, or at least a decision to accord these crimes very low priority and no or very little resources." 68 From a practical standpoint, a prosecutor in a certain district is probably more interested in crimes occurring in that district than devoting scarce resources on a case occurring in Iraq or Afghanistan. Without an internal push in terms of priority from within the organization, it is unlikely such cases will be given the requisite priority. Bureaucratic inertia will keep such cases at the bottom of the pile. However this is not MEJA"s only challenge. As
Congress learned a few years after the law was passed, the language of the statute itself was inadequate.
MEJA Amended in 2004
In 2000 Coordinator that was held for allegations related to a sexual assault. 83 In the Adolph case, the U.S. District Court for D.C. ordered a response from the DoJ and the DoJ responded by informing the court it will prosecute the case under MEJA, causing
Adolph to dismiss his quest for habeas relief. 84 In the Breda case, the DoJ responded by requesting that the judge dismiss the case as moot, arguing that restrictions on Breda were removed and he had returned to Texas. 85 This indicates UCMJ jurisdiction will not be pursued.
It is unclear at the time of this writing whether the federal government will pursue a MEJA case.
Even if UCMJ jurisdiction over civilians is deemed constitutional in a future case, it will likely be so only in a narrow set of circumstances in which hostilities are ongoing. Courts may struggle to clearly define this. Consider Iraq today where U.S. forces are actively engaging insurgents in part of the country while focusing predominantly on reconstruction efforts in another part of the country. How close to the hostilities will a contractor have to be to be within the reach of the UCMJ? What about contractors in countries supporting the efforts in
Afghanistan and Iraq such as those in Kuwait, like the contractor discussed above?
An expanded MEJA avoids the constitutional questions surrounding the UCMJ.
However, the key will be in successfully implementing such a new provision. MEJA"s track record has been poor. The legislation itself offers no panacea. Resources, cooperation with other agencies and priority by DoJ will dictate ultimate success. Yet, given the public backlash and increased Congressional attention resulting from incidents such as Abu Ghraib and Al Nisur, a favorable environment for an increased priority of effort exists.
One additional change to MEJA is worth mentioning. On its face, it only applies to felony offenses, making it less flexible than the UCMJ. Perhaps MEJA could be amended by 
Conclusion
The number of contractors serving alongside military members in contingency operations around the world has increased dramatically in recent years. Since 2000, Congress has made efforts to close the jurisdictional gap for contractors that commit crimes while operating abroad in support of military operations. At the most fundamental level, addressing the gap is important to ensure fairness and accountability. Simply stated, an American contractor should not be immune from prosecution because the crime was committed in a foreign country rather than the United States.
In the context of America"s battle against terrorists, the relationship between accountability and public opinion has become increasingly important. For the last eight years, the U.S. has struggled with winning the war of ideas. Highly publicized incidents such as Abu Ghraib and Al Nisur provide fuel for radical extremists to further anti-American sentiment.
Ensuring a proper legal framework exists to prosecute contractors serving with the military abroad helps the U.S. wage the information battle. It is one aspect of a larger information campaign that helps counter the propaganda of radical extremists in an effort aimed at positively influencing more moderate voices and preventing them from becoming extremist recruits.
The enactment of and subsequent modification of MEJA as well as the amendment of the UCMJ offer vehicles for holding contractors accountable. However, the effect of the recent UCMJ change on contractor accountability will likely be limited, making it a bit of a paper tiger.
Statutory construction of the UCMJ language, constitutional concerns, and a cautious DoD approach to exercising such jurisdiction will all work to limit the use of the new provision. As a result, Congress should look to strengthen MEJA to ensure legal loopholes no longer exist to preclude the prosecution of contractor misconduct. By further clarifying and expanding MEJA"s reach and, perhaps more importantly, executing it consistently and fairly, the United States will enhance its credibility as a beacon of justice. In doing so, it helps undercut the claims of radical extremists who seek to undermine U.S. standing throughout the world.
